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ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE*
JESSICA LITMAN
Ten years ago, when I wrote War Stories,' copyright lawyers
were fighting over the question whether unlicensed personal,
noncommercial copying, performance or display would be
deemed copyright infringement. I described three strategies that
lawyers for book publishers, record labels, and movie studios had
deployed to try to assure that the question was answered the way
they wanted it to be. First, copyright owners were labeling all
unlicensed uses as "piracy" on the ground that any unlicensed use
might undermine copyright owners' control. That epithet helped
to obscure the difference between unlicensed uses that invaded
defined statutory exclusive rights and other unlicensed uses that
might not be illegal. Second, copyright lobbyists insisted that
Internet service providers and the makers of software or devices
that allowed consumers to engage in unlicensed uses of
copyrighted works had a legal obligation to act as copyright police.
Finally, copyright owners had filed lawsuits against businesses that
sought to exploit statutory gaps or legal privileges to make money
from the unlicensed enjoyment of copyrighted works with the
apparent goal of litigating those businesses into bankruptcy,
whether or not their business models were actually illegal.
A decade later, those strategies have yielded mixed results.
Dozens of new businesses have folded in the face of litigation.
Napster, Limewire, Scour, Aimster, 321Studios, Sonic Blue,
Zediva, Olga, Veoh, Bnetd.org, Puretunes.com, Bolt.com,
LokiTorrent, Bleem!, and MP3Board are gone. Some of them
hung on long enough to be litigated into dust. Napster, for
example, managed to raise several defenses that the courts agreed
merited further consideration. It persuaded the 9"' Circuit that it
should be permitted to show at trial that the safe harbor provisions
* Per-mission is hereby granted for noncommercial reproduction of this Article, in whole
or in part, for education or research purposes, including the making of multiple copies
for classroom use, subject only to the condition that the name of the author, a complete
citation, and this copyright notice and grant of permission be included in all copies.
John F. Nickoll Professor of Law and Professor of Information, University of Michigan.
Jon Weinberg provided his usual insightful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of
this essay. @ 2012 Jessica Litman.
I Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337 (2002).
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in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act shielded it from liability.
Napster also convinced the district court that it should be able to
conduct further discovery on the questions whether the record
labels actually owned the recordings they claimed and whether
their anticompetitive conduct in licensing digital distribution of
their recordings constituted copyright misuse.' The trial never
happened, of course. Napster ran out of money and shut down.
Not satisfied with merely burying Napster, music publishers and
labels sought to drive a stake through its heart: They filed a
copyright infringement suit against the venture capital firm that
had invested in Napster, claiming that it, too, should be held liable
for the copyright infringements committed by 60,000 Napster
users.4
In MGM v. Grokster, motion picture studios and record labels
persuaded the Supreme Court that distributing peer-to-peer file
sharing software with the intent that individuals use it to share
copyrighted files over the Internet was itself unlawful, because its
goal was to encourage individuals to infringe. A company that
distributed file sharing software with the aim of promoting
infringement, the Court ruled, could be held liable for
deliberately inducing infringement.5
It would seem to follow that the file sharing itself is copyright
infringement. No court has disagreed. The record labels filed
tens of thousands of lawsuits against individual peer-to-peer file
sharers between 2003 and 2008.6 Most of the cases settled. A
small handful went to trial, where defendants lost badly. Courts
rebuffed defendants' arguments that their file sharing should be
privileged as fair use or innocent infringement.' Where cases
were tried to juries, labels succeeded in persuading jurors to hold
2 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 512 of the
Copyright Act allows Internet service providers to avoid liability both for infringing
material stored on their servers at the instance of users and for links or other pointers to
sites containing infringing material, so long as they remove the material or links when
properly notified by the copyright owner. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). Napster argued that it
neither hosted nor transmitted infringing content; it merely provided links or pointers to
copies of content on users' hard disks. Thus, it claimed, it qualified for the safe harbor in
section 512(d) for information location tools. The court concluded that whether Napster
could take advantage of the safe harbor raised issues that Would need to be more fully
developed at trial. 239 F.3d at 1025.
, In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
4 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Himmer-Winblad, 377 F. Supp. 2d 796 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
5 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005).
6 See generally Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Ausic lndusy to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 19, 2008) http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI22966038836021137.html; RIAA v.
The People: 5 Years Later, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 30, 2008),
https://www.eff.ortz/w /iiaa-v-xeople-five-vears-latei.
7 See, e.g., 1MIG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 885, 89 91 (7t1 Cir. 2 005); Maverick
Recording v. Haiper, 598 F. 3d 193 (5" Cir.), cer. denied, 131 S, Ct. 590 (2010); Sony BMG
Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217 (D. Mass. 2009). See also Arista
Records LLC v. Doe, 604 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (holdin assertions of fair use
privilege to use P2P insufficient grounds to quash subpoena seeking file sharer's identity).
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defendants liable for hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages
for willful infringement.' The question whether it is legal for
individuals to share copies of copyrighted music or movies over
peer-to-peer file sharing networks, then, appears to have been
settled definitely in copyright owners' favor. Online copyright
infringement, however, does not appear to have decreased.'
Shortly after its victory in Grokster, the recording industry
floated the suggestion that peer-to-peer file sharing was not so dire
a threat as consumers' unauthorized copying of CDs."' Strong
copy-protection technology would be needed to protect music
from consumers who ripped and burned CDs they bought from
record stores." Early efforts to protect recorded music with strong
digital copy protection led to public relations disasters: some
didn't work;" another worked too well, disabling personal
computers and leading to FTC action and a recall of the protected
disks." The inadequacies of copyright protection technology
turned out to matter less than one might have envisioned, because
record stores had already begun to disappear.1 4 A year after the
Grokster decision, Tower Records filed for bankruptcy." The
company's assets were sold in liquidation, and the last Tower
8 See Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tennenbaum,
http://www.cal.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/10-1883P-01A.pdf (1st Cir. 2011) (discussing
$675,000 juLy verdict); Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn.
2010) ($1.92 million jury verdict).
9 See, e.g., Cisco Visual Networking Index: Usage, CIscO I (Oct. 25, 2010),
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateial/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/Cisco V
NIUsageWP.pdf ("While still growing in absolute terms, P2P is growing more slowly
than visual networking and other advanced applications."); Eduardo Porter, Editolial,
State ?f Play-The Perpetual War: Pirates and Ceators, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2012)
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/opinion/sunday/peirpetual-war-digital-pirates-and-
creators.html; Technical Report: An Estimate of Infringing Use on the Internet,
ENVISIONAL 2-3 (January 2011), http://documents.envisional.com/docs/Envisional-
Internet UsageJan2011.pdf (Commissioned by NBC-Universal).
1o Tom Zeller, Jr., The Ghost in the (1), N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/14/business/14rights.html (quoting Mitch Bainwol,
chief executive of the RIAA); Mitch Bainwol, Chief Exec. Officer, Recording Indus. Ass'n
of Am., Building a Brighter Future: Making AND Selling Great Music (August 12, 2005),
available at http://dreadedmonkeygod.net/home/attachments/Bainwol.pdf.
11 SeeBainwol, supra note 10.
12 See, e.g., (D Crack: Magic Marker Indeed, WIRED (May 20, 2002),
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2002/05/52665; Brij Khurana,
Halderman GS Sees Copy-,rotection Flaw in New CDs, DAILY PRINCETONIAN (Oct. 9, 2003),
http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/2003/10/09/8785.
13 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Sony BMG Settles FTC Charges (Jan. 30, 2007),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/01/sony.shtm; J. Alex Halderman & Edward W.
Felten, Lessons friom Sony CD DRM Episode, HALDERMAN (Feb. 14, 2006),
https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/rootkit-secO6-full.pdf.
14 See, e.g., 40 Sad Portiatis of Closed Record Stores, BuzzFEED,
http://www.buzzfeed.com/mjs538/40-sad-poltlaits-of-closed-record-stores.
15Yuki Noguchi, A Broken Record Store, '"ASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/aiticle/2006/08/22/AR2006082201350.html; Tower Records Bankruptcy
Heralds Indushy Changes, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 23, 2006),
http://www.pbs.oig/newshoui/bb/business/jul-dec06/music_08-23.html.
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Records store closed before Christmas.' Musicland liquidated,
selling its Sam Goody's record stores to Best Buy, which rebranded
some of them as FYE stores and closed the rest. Virgin Megastore
closed its stores in 2009.1
Did peer-to-peer file sharing kill the record stores? Did
Grokster come too late to save them? Probably not. Other brick-
and-mortar outlets for copyrighted works went out of business en
masse at about the same time, even though there was no
significant copyright piracy problem affecting their products. As
the record stores closed down, for example, book stores began to
vanish. First, beloved independent booksellers shut their doors;"
then the Borders Group declared bankruptcy, ultimately
liquidating all of its stores."' Newspapers shrank; some closed."'
Video stores went out of business.21  Copyright infringement had
very little to do with any of this. Some of it was bad business
judgment.22  Some of it was bad business luck: not all business
models made obsolete by digital technology had obvious
is See Paul Farhi, For Tower Records, End of Disc, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2006)
http://www .washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/aiticle/2006/12/10/AR2006121001003.html.
17 Ben Sisario, Reailing Era Closes with MVu sic M/egastore, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2009)
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/15/arts/music/15virgin.html.
18 See, e.g., Robert Weisman, Wordkworth Books' Final Chapter Is Saturday, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 27, 2004, at C.5, available at
http://www.boston.com/ae/books/articles/2004/10/27/wordsworthbooks-final-chapt
er is saturday; Thomas J. Lueck, Coliseum Books to Close Permanently by Year's End, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 3, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/03/nyregion/03coliseum.html;
Mary Morgan, Shaman Drum Bookshop to Close June 30, ANN ARBOR CHRON. (June 9, 2009),
http://annarboichrionicle.com/2009/06/09/shaman-drum-bookshop-to-close-june-30;
Michael Taylor, Cody', Landmark Berkeley Bookstore, Closes: Poor Sales Blamed for Cody's
Demise, S.F. CHRON. (June 23, 2008), http://aiticles.sfgate.com/2008-06-
23/news/ 17165395_1_telegiaph-avenue-uc-beikeley-cody-s-owner; Ethan Wilensky-
Lanford, Wall-to-Wall Books, and All oJ Them nor the Landlord, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/23/nyregion/23gotham.html.
19 Mike Spector & Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, Borders Tored to Liquidate, Close All Stores, WALL
ST. J. (July 19, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303661904576454353768550280.html.
20 E.g., Lee C. Bollinger, joiurnalism Needs Governtment Help, WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704629804575324782605510168.html.
21 E.g., Hollywood Video Stores to Close, BUs. J. (May 11, 2010, 1:01 AM),
http://www.bizjouinals.com/milwaukee/stories/2010/05/10/daily22.html. Netflix
probably contributed an enoLmous amount to the video stores' demise by coming up with
a more attractive business model that competed with the brick-and-mortar stores on
convenience, price and selection. Copyright owners may have resented Netflix for its
efficient exploitation of the first sale doctrine codified in 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2006), see
Brooks Barnes, A Bid to Get Film Lovers Not to Rent, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/12/business/media/with-flixster-studios-bet-
consumeis-wNill-buy-movies-again.html, but there was nothing infringing about its video-
rental business.
22 Book publishers' decisions to set retail book prices high enough to allow online
booksellers to make a profit while offering forty percent discounts and free shipping
seems, at least in retrospect, to have been shortsighted. In his book Ripped, music critic
Greg Kot argues that part of the decline of CD sales in the early twenty-first century
should, similarly, be blamed on extravagant increases in CD retail prices. See GREG KOT,
RIPPED: HOW THE WIRED GENERATION REVOLUTIONIZED MuSIC 45-47 (2009).
[Vol. 30:53
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substitutes."
The relentless litigation, though, did have the effect of
temporarily clearing the field of pesky unlicensed startups in the
digital music, ebook, and online video businesses, presumably
making room for record labels, book publishers and movie studios
to introduce their own versions. More on that in a minute.
Not all of the lawsuits were as successful. In 2001, literary
agent Arthur Klebanoff started Rosetta Books, an independent
ebook publisher. Rosetta licensed the ebook rights to popular
older novels from their authors, and made the novels available in
ebook format. The day after Rosetta's website went live, Random
House filed a federal copyright infringement suit, claiming that as
publisher of the original books, it owned the ebook rights.24 The
courts disagreed." When an Internet service provider invited real
estate agents to post listings on its website, a national real estate
information provider filed suit, claiming that it owned the
copyright in the images of properties for sale. The court held that
the service provider was not liable for infringement." Record
labels failed to persuade courts that Launchcast's music streaming
service, which allowed listeners to create personalized playlists,
exceeded the scope of the statutory webcasting license.21 Several
cases settled with defendant businesses' continuing to engage in
their allegedly infringing activities. Marvel Comics backed down
from its suit against NC Soft over its online game City of Heroes." A
massive class action against Google for making digital copies of
library books has been mired in complexity. The parties would
prefer a settlement to continued litigation, but have been unable
to agree on settlement terms that the court would find to be "fair,
adequate and reasonable.""' Meanwhile, Google continues to
2- Newspapers have relied for centuries on a business model that bundled journalism with
classified ads; they were able to charge little or nothing for subscriptions because they
could sell their readers' eyeballs to advertisers. The introduction of Craigslist and similar
sites made the bundle an inefficient alternative for classified advertising; without the
subsidy of classified ads, though, newspapers lost money.
24 Reader's CII(: Despite the Limited Selection, e-books are Taking off at Libraries, Univesities
and Online Retailers, NEWSDAY (New York), July 11, 2001, at CIO.
25 Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), affd,
283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002). Random House nonetheless claims that, notwithstanding the
decision, it owns the ebook rights to all of its backlist books. SeeJeffiey A. Trachtenberg,
Random Ilouse Lays Claim to e-Book Rights, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704121504574594113096154756.html.
2G CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004), affg 164 F. Supp. 2d
688 (D. Md. 2001).
27 Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2009).
28 Press Release: Marvel Entertainment, Inc., NCsoft Corporation, NC Interactive, Inc.,
Cryptic Studios, Inc. Settle All Litigation (December 14, 2005), available at
http://us.ncsoft.com/en/news/press-releases/marvel-enteirtai.html; see Marvel
Enterprises v. NCSoft Corp., No. CV 04-9253-RGK (C.D. Cal. March 2, 2005).
29 The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
2012] 57
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digitize the books." Long-running lawsuits filed by content
owners against Google 1 and Amazon.com"2 for inducing copyright
infringement on the Grokster model have so far resulted in court
rulings that favor defendants more than plaintiffs. Still, the overall
success of the music, movie and other content industries in
persuading courts to endorse a broad interpretation of their
copyright rights was impressive. Although consumers apparently
didn't significantly reduce their online copyright infringement,
the lawsuits did a pretty good job of discouraging new businesses
designed to profit from it.
Medical experts tell us that powerful antibiotics are highly
effective in killing off both good and bad bacteria, but at a
significant risk. Bugs that survive the treatment grow bigger,
stronger, and resistant to antibiotics. They become much more
dangerous because they are so much harder to kill.
Indiscriminate litigation against new entrants into the
entertainment and information marketplace killed off a broad
swathe of potential competitors and partners. The ones who were
left, though, faced a less crowded field because old media had
helpfully cleared it for them. The music, movie, and book
publishing businesses no doubt expected to take advantage of the
opening themselves, but discovered significant difficulties in doing
it well.
As it vanquished start-up businesses through strenuous
litigation, the music industry made some tentative and not
especially successful forays into digital music." Sony Music was
first, with a clunky website that permitted tethered download of a
limited selection of copy-protected files for $3.49 per track. The
service was widely panned, even after Sony lowered its prices." In
sM Kim Armstrong, One Million Books Scanned and Returned to CIC University Libraries, INSIDE
GOOGLE BOOKS BLOG (Feb. 4, 2011), http://bookseaich.blogspot.com/2011/02/one-
million-books-scanned-and-returned.html. This past September, frustrated by the
stalemate, the Authors Guild filed a related lawsuit against some of Google's university
library partners. Authors Guild v. Hathi Trust, No. 1:2011cy06351 (S.D.N.Y., filed Sept.
12, 2011). See also James Griimmelmann, The Ophan Wars, LABORATORIUM (Sept. 12,
2011), http://laboiatorium.net/aichive/2011/09/12/the-oiphanwars.
31 E.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Viacom Int'l,
Inc. V. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
32 Perfect 10, 508 F. 3d 1146.
", See, e.g., About Antimicrobial Resistance: A Brief Overview, CENTER FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION (July 22, 2010),
http://www.cdc.gov/driugresistance/about.html; Antibiotic Resistance Questions and
Answers, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (June 30, 2009),
http://www.cdc.gov/getsmart/antibiotic-use/anitbiotic-iesistance-faqs.html; Kate
Murphy, In Some Cases, Even Bad Bacteia May Be Good, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/01/health/scientist-examines-possible-link-between-
antibiotics-and-obesity html.
8' See, e.g., Dawn C. Chmielewski, Fee-Based Online Music Services Sing the Blues, SAN JOSE
MERCURYNEWS, Dec. 2, 2002, at IA.
" See Steve Jones, Major Labels Hop on Lump)y Gavy Train: They Distort Ideal Ease of
Downloading, USA TODAY, Nov. 1, 2000, at 3D; Amy Kover, Napster: The Hot Idea ofthe Year
[Vol. 30:53
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2001, two major labels formed an unsuccessful joint venture with
AOL and Real Networks to offer paid music subscription services
through online retail partners. They christened their venture
"MusicNet."" In 2002, major labels launched PressPlay, a money-
losing music subscription service widely criticized for low-quality
audio, limited selection, and unfriendly licensing restrictions."
PressPlay wouldn't license its music to MusicNet; MusicNet
wouldn't license its music to PressPlay." Neither service attracted
a significant subscriber base. Nor did either service generate
significant royalties for recording artists."9 When Napster shut
down, Roxio bought its service marks and logos in a bankruptcy
liquidation auction, purchased PressPlay from the labels, and
rebranded PressPlay as Napster 2.0.4( Meanwhile, in 2001,
Listen.com had rolled out Rhapsody, a competing music
streaming service featuring recordings from independent labels.
Over the next year, Rhapsody secured licenses from the five major
labels.41 journalists praised the service,42 but it struggled
Lawsuits MNay Kill Naps/er but the Concept Behind /he Comipany Could Revolutionize Infotech and
Reinvigorate the P( Industy, FORTUNE MAG. (June 26, 2000),
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/foitune/foitunearchive/2000/06/26/283031/inde
x.htm.
36 See Don Davis, Record Giants, AOL and RealNetwoks Form MusicNe, INTERNET RETAILER
(Apr. 2, 2001, 12:00 AM), http://www.internetietailer.com/2001/04/02/iecoid-giants-
aol-and-realnetworks-form-musicnet. MusicNet was chronically short of cash. Consumers
hated it, and, a few years later, the labels sold their stake. See Saul Hansell, Plivate
Investment Firn Buys MusicNet Venture, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/13/business/media/13net.html.
37 E.g., Dan Tynan, The 25 Woist Tech Products of All Time, PCWORLD (May 26, 2006),
http: //ww.pcworld.com/ article/ 125772-
3/the_25 woist tech-products-of all time.html.
,8 Devin Leonard, Songs in the Key of Steve: Stevejobs May Have just Greated the First Great Legal
Online Music Service. That's Got the Record Biz Singing His Praises, CNN MONEY (May 12,
2003),
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/foitune/fortunearchive/2003/05/12/342289/inde
x.htm. The two services may have had antitrust law worries about cooperating rather than
competing. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D. Cal.
2002). Both services eventually permitted subscribers to downloaded copy-protected
versions of a limited number of songs, but allowed subscribers to listen to them only so
long as they continued to pay monthly subscription fees. See Peter Burrows, Ronald
Grover & Tom Lowry, Steve jobs, the Alusic Man, BUSINESS'EEK (Apr. 18, 2003),
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/apr2003/tc20030418_9975.htm.
39 See Neil Strauss, Recod Labels'Answer /o Napster Still Ias Artists Feeling Bypa ssed, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 18, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/18/aits/iecoid-labels-answer-to-
napster-still-has-airtists-feeling-bypassed.html.
'ojim Hu, PressPlay Bid Points to Napster Rem ix, CNET NEWS (May 19, 2003, 8:29 AM),
http://news.cnet.com/Pressplay-bid-points-to-Napster-remix/2100-1027_3-1007516.html.
The rebranded service never caught on. A year later, Roxio spun Napster off; it struggled.
In 2008, it sold itself to Best Buy. Napster continued to lose subscribers. Three years
later, Best Buy sold Napster to Rhapsody. See Best Buy Gets Back to Basics, Exits Mobile Mu sic
Biz with Napster Sale, FORBES (Oct. 17, 2011, 11:44 AM),
http://www.foibes.com/sites/gieatspeculations/2011/10/17/best-buy-gets-back-to-basics-
exits-mobile-msic-biz-wvith-napster-sale.
41 See Amy Harmon, Copyfight Jrdles Confront Selling of Music on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 23, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/23/business/copyright-hurdles-
confront-selling-of-music-on-the-inteinet.html.
42 E.g., Tom Di Nome, Basics; You Listen, You Pay: Post-Napster Music Services, N.Y. TIMES
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financially.4
In 2003, Apple launched the iTunes store, offering customers
the opportunity to purchase copy-protected downloads of
recorded music for 99W per track." Initially, the iTunes Store
worked only with Macintosh computers, which had a three
percent share of the worldwide computer market. Record labels
described the launch of the iTunes music store as an experiment;
Apple's tiny market share made it a pilot project with relatively low
stakes. 1) The experiment was fabulously successful: in its first
week, the iTunes music store sold more than a million tracks. By
the end of the year, Apple had introduced a Windows-compatible
version, and sold more than 25 million songs.46 In 2005, it added
video and movies.
The content owners' insistence on copy protection initially
worked to Apple's advantage. Its iPod line was by far the market
leader in portable digital music players. Music purchased from
the iTunes store could play on iPods but not on Rios, Zens, or
Zunes. Music downloaded from Napster could be played on a Rio
or a Nomad, but not on an iPod.4 7 Rhapsody limited its service to
music streaming, and did not offer downloads at all until 2005;
those downloads initially played only on a handful of portable
players. Customers who wanted to play music on their iPods faced
the choice of ripping their own CDs, downloading MP3 files from
peer-to-peer networks, or buying tracks from iTunes. Apple
quickly became the leading music retailer in the United States.
Apple's unexpected dominance in the music download
market made record labels uncomfortable." Labels resented
(Mar. 7, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/07/technology/basics-you-listen-yot-
pay-post-napster-imusic-sevices.html; Jefferson Graham, Money-to-Buin Rhapsody Is Music to
Consumers' Ears, USA TODAY, (Feb. 25, 2003),
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/webguide/internetlife/notablesites/2003-02-25-
rhapsody_x.htm.
l, See John Borland, Listen.com Sings Solo Tune, CNET NEWS (Jan. 28, 2002, 1:45 PM),
http://news.cnet.com/Listen.com-sings-solo-tune/2100-1023_3-824502.html; Graham,
supra note 42.
44 Edward C. Baig, At the iTunes Music Store, ShoppingIs a Breeze, USA TODAY (Apr. 29, 2003,
9:03 PM), http://www.ulsatoday.com/tech/columnist/edwaidbaig/2003-04-29-
itunes x.htm; John Borland, Apple Unzveils Music Store, CNET NEWS (Apr. 28, 2003, 12:16
PM), http://news.cnet.com/Apple-unveils-music-stoie/2100-1027_3-998590.html.
45John Borland, Apple's Mu sic: Evolution, Not Revolution, CNET News, (Apr. 29, 2003, 4:00
AM) http://news.cnet.com/Apples-music-Evolition%2C-not-reVolItion/2100-1027_3-
998675.html ("Label executives privately say the Apple service is an experiment, which
could be expanded if it proves successful. Apple's small market share means that the
stakes are relatively low. 'It's a test, with a small subset of consumers,' one label executive
said.").
46 E.g., Theresa Howard, Ads fin iPods Offer Big Music in Small Package, USA TODAY (Jan. 5,
2004, 3:11 AM), http://wNw.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-01-05-ipod-x.htm.
47 See Portable Devices Compatible With Napster, NAPSTER,
http://web.archiive.org/web/20041213024911/http://www.napstei.com/compatible-dev
ices/ (archived Dec. 13, 2004).
48 SeeJohn Borland, Music Moguls Trunped by Stevejobs?, CNET NEWS (Apr. 15, 2005, 4:00
AM), http://news.cnet.com/Music-moguls-tirumped-by-Steve-Jobs/2100-1027_3-
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Apple's insistence on setting a flat ninety-nine cent price for all
downloads. They wanted the option to control the price of their
product. Apple's iTunes had become too big for them to simply
withdraw their recordings in favor of other services. The labels
hoped, though, that the cellular telephone market would allow
them to forge more advantageous partnerships.4 ' (Apple would
soon dash those hopes by introducing an iPhone.") Competing
music services, meanwhile, claimed that Apple should be forced to
license its copy protection to other music services and to
manufacturers of competing portable players.51 RealNetworks,
now the owner of Rhapsody, released software to make Rhapsody
downloads iPod-compatible;' Apple promptly redesigned its
software so that the hack wouldn't work." Customers complained;
some sued."
Apple reconsidered the benefits of copy protection. At least
in the music business, it had probably gained most of the
competitive advantage offered by the incompatibility of music files
purchased from competing services with its popular player. In
February of 2007, Steve Jobs announced that he hoped to get rid
of copy protection on iTunes music.55 In April, iTunes announced
a deal to sell tracks from EMI in a higher quality format, at a
premium price, and without copy protection. Still
uncomfortable with Apple's dominant market position, EMI and
Vivendi licensed their music to Amazon.com; that fall,
Amazon.com opened its MP3 store, selling digital downloads of




5 See Fred Vogelstein, The Untold Story: flow iPhone Blew up the Wireless Industy, WIRED,
(Jan. 9, 2008), http://www.wired.com/gadgets/wireless/magazine/16-02/ffiphone.
5 See Editorial, The Digital Divide, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/26/opinion/26thurs3.html.
52 Eric Bangeman, RealNeworks Cacks the Fairplay Code, ARS TECHNICA (uly 26, 2004, 2:37
AM), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2004/07/4030.ars.
5 Peter Cohen, RealNetwoks Promises Ipod Fix, PCWORLD (Dec. 16, 2004, 9:00 AM),
http: //ww.pcworld.com/ article/ 118975 /realnetworks-promises-ipod-fix.html.
54 The Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litigation, No. 5:2005-cy00037 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3,
2005); Pamela MacLean and Karen Gullo, Apple's Jobs Must Answer Questions in iTunes
Antitrust Suit, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 22, 2011, 3:14 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-22/apple-s-jobs-must-answer-questions-in-
itunes-antitrust-dispute.html; Jim Wagner, Apple Hit by Lawsuit, INTERNETNEWS.COM (Jan.
6, 2005), http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/3455431.
55 E.g., Cory Doctorow, Will Steve jobs Drop iTunes DRM in a Ileartbeal?, BOINGBOING (Feb.
6, 2007, 9:06 PM), http://boingboing.net/2007/02/06/will-stevejobs-drop.html.
5 See Jim Dalrymple, Apple, E11 O{Je Ilighe- Quality, DRM Flee Downloads, MACWORLD
(Apr. 2, 2007, 3:00 AM),
http://www.macworld.com/aiticle/57098/2007/04/drmfiee.html.
5 See Keith Regan, Amazon Pounces on iTunes withI MP3 S/oie, ECOMMERCE TIMES, (Sept. 25,
2007, 2:57 PM), http://www.ecommercetimes.com/sto-y/59498.html. In 2010, book
publishers adopted a similar strategy to gain leverage over Amazon.com. Amazon.com
insisted on setting ebook prices substantially below the prices of hardcover and paperback
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Meanwhile, the owners of video programming found Apple's
dominance as a seller of online video as unnerving as the labels
had." NBC grumbled that the revenues it had earned from
iTunes sales of its content were paltry, and insisted that it should
get more control over the price of video downloads of its content
and a share of the revenue Apple earned from iPod sales."' Apple
refused. NBC announced that it would withdraw its programming
from iTunes at the end of the current contract, and would instead
launch its own advertising-supported subscription streaming video-
on-demand service in partnership with Fox at Hulu.com. Apple
responded that it would stop carrying new NBC television
programming four months earlier, at the beginning of the new
season."0 The divorce generated tons of news coverage,"' but
lasted only a year before NBC returned to iTunes on Apple's
terms." Meanwhile, NBC had launched Hulu.com."' Hulu was,
books. Publishers believed those prices were too low, and resented Amazon.com's
resistance to raising them. Publishers responded to the impasse by negotiating ebook
licenses with Apple that permitted the publishers to set ebook prices. They then
threatened to withdraw their ebooks from Amazon.com unless it agreed to adopt the
same pricing terms. Amazon.com capitulated. See Motoko Rich & Brad Stone, Piblisher
Wins Figh with Amazon ove E-Books, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/01/technology/companies/Olamazonweb.html;
Motoko Rich, Publishers Win a Bout in E-Book Pice Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/books/09google.html. Both the United States
Justice Department and the European Commission have announced investigations to
determine whether the ebook pricing deal between book publishers and Apple violated
antitrust laws. U.S., European Regulaors look at E-Books, REUTERS (Dec. 7, 2011, 5:27 p.m.),
http://www.ieuters.com/article/2011/12/07/us-ebooks-antitrust-
idUSTRE7B62BX20111207.
58Joshua Chaffin, NBC Chie/ Wans over iTunes Pficing, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Oct.
30, 2007, at 17, available at ProQuest ID 1374619611; Cliff Edwards, I Want My iTV,
BUSINESSHEEK (Nov. 19, 2007),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_47/b4059401.htm.; Katie Marsal,
NBC Chief Says Apple "Destroyed" Music Pricing, APPLEINSIDER, (Oct. 29, 2007, 5:00 PM),
http://www.appleinsider.com/aiticles/07/10/29/nbc-chief-says-apple-destroyed-music
pricing.html.
5 See Tom Krazit, Report: NBC Wanted a Cut of iPod Revenue, CNET NEWS (Oct. 29, 2007
4:15 p.m.), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-9806737-37.html; Michael Learmonth,
Zucker Says Apple Deal Rotten, VARIETY (Oct. 29, 2007, 7:34 a.m.),
http://www.vaiiety.com/article/VR1117974910.
GO Natalie Finn, NBC Gets a Download of Itself E! ONLINE (Sept. 19, 2007, 9:28 PM),
http://www.eonline.com/news/nbc-gets download of itself/56222; Brian Garrity, Apple
Peels back NB(-iTunes Deal, N.Y. PosT (Sept. 1, 2007, 5:00 AM),
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/itemS349t7msmCO7HOqdi0XXzM.
G1 E.g., Frank Ahrens, Apple in a Fight>for Rights to TV Shows, WASH. PosT (Oct. 25, 2007),
http://www .washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/aiticle/2007/10/24/AR2007102402410.html; Brooks Barnes, NBC Will Not
Renew iTunes Contract, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/31/technology/31NBC.html.
62 Brian Stelter, NBC Shows Will Return to iTunes, N.Y. TIMES BLOG, (Sept. 9, 2008, 2:46
PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/09/nbc-shoWs-wNill-return-to-
itunes.
G- Michael Learmonth, NBC, News Corp Unveil IIulu.corn, VARIETY (Oct. 28, 2007, 11:00
PM), http://www.vaiiety.com/aiticle/VRI117974896?refCatId=1009; Brad Stone, Testing
Over, IIulu.com to Open its TV and Film O)ferings this Week, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 11, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/11/business/media/1l1hulu.html.
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and has continued to be, modestly successful. It didn't make
money in its initial years, but it attracted a growing base of
subscribers and advertisers. But Hulu had to contend with a
variety of other video-streaming sites, some licensed and others
unlicensed, which had gotten to the market before it.
At the same time as Apple was establishing dominance in the
video download market, AOL, MSN and RealNetworks rolled out
subscription-based streaming of television clips." Meanwhile,
small start-ups were launching video-streaming sites based on user-
uploaded videos.'" Vimeo appeared in 2004 and began accepting
video uploads in May of 2005.66 YouTube6' and Veoh6S launched
in 2005. The same year, Google augmented its video search
engine with the opportunity to upload videos.'' Bloggers started
vlogging.o Photo-sharing sites like Photobucket added video
capability.' Grouper.com,7' Bolt," and others joined in. By July,
c|Net journalist Greg Sandoval reported that more than 150 video
sharing sites had cropped up in the past year.7
Within months, YouTube became the web's most popular
G Mark Berniker, Microsoft Debuts Free MISN Video Service, INTERNETNEWS.COM (Oct. 14,
2003), http://wwwx.inteinetnews.com/ec-news/ar-ticle.php/3091691.
G5 See, e.g., Scott Kirsner, Video Stars a la Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/28/technology/28iht-ptvideo29.html; Video That's
Languishing? Put it on the Net Instead, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/24/business/woildbusiness/24iht-video.html.
G' About Vimeo, VIMEO,
http://web.archive.org/web/20050525004247/http://www.vimeo.com/doc about
(archived May 24, 2005); WTF, BLUMPY
http://web.archive.org/web/20041229045901/http://www.blumpy.org/vimeo/?page wt
f (archived Dec. 29, 2004).
67 Ben Ratliff, A New Trove ofMusic Video in Web's Wild Word, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/03/arts/music/03yout.html.
68 Veoh Frequently Asked Questions, VEOH,
http://web.archive.org/web/20051024082435/http://www.veoh.com/about/faq.php
(archived Oct. 24, 2005).
G9 Susan Kuchinskas, Lights, Camnera, Go(gle, INTERNETNEWS.COM (Apr. 14, 2005),
http://wwv.inteinetnews.com/ec-news/article.php/3497926. Yahoo!, MSN, and AOL
followed in 2006. See Alexandra DeFelice, AOL to Launch Flee Video-Sharing Ponal,
TECHNEWSWORLD July 31, 2006, 2:26 PM),
http://www.technewsworld.com/story/52123.html; Microsot Puts up Own Viral-Video
Website, FoxNEWS.COM, (Sept. 19, 2006),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,214556,00.html; Yahoo! Video, YAHOO!, ,
http://web.archive.org/web/20060811014031/http://video.yahoo.com (archived Aug.
11,2006).
7o Katie Dean, Blogging + Video = logging, WIRED (July 13, 2005),
http://www.wired.com/enteitainment/music/news/2005/07/68171.
71 Photobucket Home, PHOTOBUCKET,
http://web.archive.org/web/20060414162428/http://photobucket.com (archived Apr.
14, 2006).
2 See What Is Grouper?, GROUPER,
http://wveb.archive.org/web/20060206060647/http://www.giouper.com/about/wvhat.asp
x (archived Feb. 6, 2006).
73 See Why join Bolt?, BOLT,
http://web.archive.org/web/20060215081933/http://www.bolt.com/siteinfo/whyjoin.jsp
(archived Feb. 15, 2006).
74 Greg Sandoval, You Tube Dances the Copyfight Tango, CNET NEWS (July 24, 2006, 9:22
AM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1025-6097365.html.
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video destination, 15 and attracted its first copyright infringement
suit."h Critics denounced it as a business based on stealing other
people's content." Billionaire investor Mark Cuban predicted
that its copyright violations would soon lead to its being "sued into
oblivion."" Just like those other pesky startups. YouTube sought
licenses from media companies, but rights holders were
skeptical."' YouTube, after all, wasn't actually making any money
it could share. Warner Music struck a deal first; Sony BMG and
Vivendi followed. The deals gave the labels equity stakes in
YouTube" and an opportunity to choose either to block uploaded
content incorporating their recordings or to share revenue from
ads served alongside it." As some cynical observers noted at the
time, structuring the licensing deal as an equity stake enabled the
labels to shelter the proceeds from obligations to pay royalties to
artists and composers. "  Then Google bought YouTube for 1.6
billion dollars worth of Google stock. The purchase persuaded
entertainment behemoth Viacom, which was dissatisfied with the
negotiations, to stop bargaining and sue for copyright
75 Michael Liedtke, Video-Shating Site YnotTube.co, Tests Boundaries, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr.
10, 2006, 12:00 AM),
http://seattletimes.nwsou1ce.com/html/businesstechnology/2002921750_youtubel0.ht
ml; Richard McManus, YnfTube Nearly Doubles Trafic in May, READWRITEWEB (June 27,
2006), 11:38 PM, http://www.readwiiteweb.com/archiVes/youtube-nearly.php; YouTube
Serves p 100 Million Videos a Day Online, USATODAY (July 16, 2006, 9:56 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-07-16-YouTube-views-x.htm;.
76 Tlur V. YouTube, Inc., 2007 WL 1893635 (C.D. Cal. 2007), appeal dismissed, 562 F.3d 1212
(9th Cir. 2009); see Eric Berkowitz, Lawsuit Accuses Video Website YouTube of Coplyright
Infiingement, USATODAY (July 18, 2006, 8:20 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-07-18-youtube-suit-x.htm.
77 See, e.g., Jason Calacanis, Building a Business Based on Copyright Infingement (o, "Bad
Business Idea #487"), CALCANIS.COM (Feb. 3, 2006),
http://calacanis.com/2006/02/03/building-a-business-based-on-copyight-infiringement;
Olga Kharif, Sour Musical Notes on You Tube, My)Space, BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 18, 2006),
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/sep2006/tc20060918_148703.htm;
Michael Liedtke, Now Saning on the Internet: YouTube.com, USATODAY (Apr. 9, 2006, 5:35
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techinnovations/2006-04-09-youtube-
popularity-x.htm; YouTube in Copyight Gross Ilairs?, WIRED (Sept. 14, 2006),
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2006/09/71791.
78 Mark Cuban: Only a "Moron" Would Buy YouTube, FoxNEW\S.COM (Sept. 30, 2006),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,216714,00.html; see also Mark Cuban, Some
Thoughts on You Tube and Google, BLOG MATRICK (Oct. 7, 2006, 2:46 AM),
http://blogmaverick.com/2006/10/07/some-thoughts-on-youtube-and-google ("The
copyright shit is going to hit the lawsuit fan.").
79 See Don Jeffrey Bloomberg, Warner Music, You Tube Cut Music-Video Deal, USATODAY
(Sept. 19, 2006, 12:39 AM), http://wwV.usatoday.com/money/media/2006-09-19-
youtube-bloomberg x.htm.
80 Andrew Ross Sorkin & Jeff Leeds, Music Companies Grab a Share of the YnfTube Sale, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 19, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/19/technology/19net.html.
81 E.g., Catherine Holahan, YniTube's New Deep Pockets, BUSINESSHTEK (Oct. 10, 2006),
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/oct2006/tc200610100883340.htm.
82 See Nicholas Carr, Shafp the Piano Player, ROUGH TYPE (Oct. 30, 2006),
http://www.ioughtype.com/aichives/2006/10/shaft the piano.php; Don Dodge, Details
of the You Tube Deal, DON DODGE ON THE NEXT BIG THING (Oct. 31, 2006),
http://dondodge.typepad.com/thenext-big-thing/2006/10/details of the .html.
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infringement." A music publisher and British sports league
followed, filing a class action copyright suit two months later."
Those suits are ongoing, but have not so far gone well for
plaintiffs.
ByJanuary 2009, NBC's Hulu attracted 24 million viewers per
month.1 Hulu had added content from other television networks
and a major record label; it had persuaded Disney to join the
partnership; and it would shortly announce the debut of a paid
subscription version of the site." That same month, 100 million
viewers watched video on You Tube." Hulu is doing just fine,"
but it has yet to challenge YouTube for dominance in the online
streaming video market. In the summer of 2011, Hulu put itself
up for sale." Apparently, nobody wanted to buy it; the owners
announced in October that they had reconsidered their plans."
In November of 2011, the U.S. movie industry rolled out its latest
initiative, dubbed "Ultraviolet."" Early reviews have ranged from
skeptical to scathing."
The upshot of copyright owners' scorched earth litigation
strategy is that it temporarily cleared the field, making room both
for tepid, content-industry-controlled efforts to distribute music,
books, and video online, and for new entrants with the stamina
and resources to survive copyright infringement suits. Apple,
Amazon, and Google took advantage of that environment to grow
into dominant distributors who have become obligatory partners
for any serious online content distribution plan, and who insist on
84 Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see, e.g.,
Candace Lombardi, Week in Review: YouTube IHoneymoon over for Google, CNET NEWS (Mar.
16, 2007, 11:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/Week-in-review-YouTube-honeymoon-over-
for-Google/2100-1083_3-6167957.html.
84 The Football Ass'n Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 159 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
85Jason Kilar, 365 Days and Counting: Iulu Launched Publicly One Year Ago Today, HULU
BLOG (Mar. 12, 2009), http://blog.hulu.com/2009/03/12/one-year-anniversary/.




87 Chloe Albanesius, Jan. YouTube Viewes Exceed 100Mfr Fnist Time, PC MAG. (Mar. 8, 2009,
4:05 PM), http://wwv.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2342533,00.asp.




90 Sam Schechner, IIulu Puts Owners in New Quandaiy, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204346104576635312926644524.html.
91 See Ultraviolet Home, http://www.uvvu.com/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
92 See, e.g., Brooks Barnes, A Bid to Get Film Lovers Not to Rent, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/12/business/media/with-flixster-studios-bet-
consumeis-wNill-buy-movies-again.html; Casey Johnston, Your Movie on Eve;y Platfom, Sort of,
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calling the shots on price, format, and other matters that content
owners believe should rightfully be their decisions. Had copyright
owners exercised more restraint, they might have tolerated start-
ups long enough to permit them to explore and develop new
markets and gain modest footholds. At that point, big media
would have had the opportunity to purchase or grant favorable
licenses to the ones it liked best, while discouraging any of them
from achieving the sort of dominant market position that makes it
difficult for copyright owners to exercise their bargaining power.
Instead, copyright owners litigated a bunch of promising
companies into liquidation, leaving a small number of very strong
players who can insist on doing business on terms that suit them.
Book publishers, record labels and film companies have had some
modest success in playing Apple, Amazon and Google off of one
another," but less success in competing with them with businesses
structured to suit content owners' preferences.
Frustrated with the results of the litigation campaign, some
copyright owners have returned their attention to the effort to
force Internet and online service providers and device
manufactures to act as copyright police. Back in 1998, copyright
owner lobbies made a deal with Internet and online service
providers. Copyright owners could enlist service providers to
remove infringing content quickly and without the need to resort
to copyright litigation; in return, service providers who blocked
allegedly infringing content on receipt of a proper request would
be sheltered from liability for infringing material posted by their
subscribers. Congress enacted the deal as section 512 of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act.' At the time, nobody
imagined peer-to-peer file sharing; few believed that user-
generated content could compete for attention with content that
was professionally produced. A dozen years later, copyright
owners have been forced to admit that they have sometimes
abused the system, sending out takedown notices for non-
infringing content.9 5 They nonetheless complain that the burden
See, e.g., After Break with Apple, NBC Goes to Amazon, MSNBC (Sept. 4, 2007, 7:43 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20593227/#.TsVCsoD8cdM; Thomas Catan, justice
Deparnment Confirms E-Book Pricing Probe, WALL. ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2011)
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203501304577084331269336926.html;
Greg Sandoval, Google Music Launching Without Sony and Warne, CNET NEWS (Nov. 11,
2011, 3:18 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-57323505-261/google-music-
launching-without-sony-and-warnei; sources cited supra note 57.
94 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006); see War Stories, supra note 1, at 360-62. It was this statutory safe
harbor that Napster claimed should protect it from liability. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
95 See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, Warner Bros: We Issued Takedown Notices jor Files We Neve Saw,
Didn't Own Copyright to, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 9, 2011, 7:50 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/11 /wainei-admits-it-issues-takedowns-
foi-files-it-hasnt-looked-at.ais; Declan McCullagh, RIAA Apologizes for Erroneous Letters,
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of finding infringing content and requesting its removal should be
born by the businesses that make money from allowing consumers
to post it rather than by the copyright owners whose work is being
stolen."
After the Supreme Court read the copyright statute to permit
an action for inducing copyright infringement in the Grokster case,
copyright owners filed a host of suits against Internet and online
service providers for inducement, claiming that the businesses
induced massive copyright infringement by inviting consumers to
upload files, many of which were infringing."1 If they hoped to
expand service provider liability to encompass an affirmative duty
to police their sites for infringing content, they were disappointed.
Courts held that services that invited individuals to upload user-
generated content, but blocked allegedly infringing content on
receipt of a takedown notice, were entitled to the shelter of
section 512." When services providing online "music lockers"
popped up, copyright owners filed suit, claiming that the services
were inducing consumers to commit copyright infringement by
copying their music files and transmitting them to a remote
location." Defendants argued that their services came within the
section 512 safe harbor. The first court to decide the issue
agreed.1"" Even before that decision, though, Amazon.com,
Google, and Apple had announced their own online music locker
storage services, and had insisted that while they would seek
licenses from rights holders if such licenses were available on
CNET NEWS (May 13, 2003, 4:41 PM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1025-1001319.html;
Ryan Paul, Oh No You Didn 't: Warner Ilits Lessig Vid with DM(A Takedown, ARS TECHNICA
(Apr. 29, 2009, 10:05 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/04/lessig-
presentation-on-youtuibe-hit-with-dmca-takedown-notice.ars; see generall Wendy Seltzei,
Free Speech Uttmored in Coppight's Safe Hatbor: Chilling Effctts / the DMCA on the First
Amendment, 24 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 171, 177-87, 204-25 (2010) (describing examples).
, See e.g., Greg Sandoval, RIAA Lawyer Says DMA May Need Overhaul, CNET NEWS (Nov.
6, 2011, 8:59 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-57319344-261/riaa-lawyei-says-
dmca-may-need-overhaul.
97 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv., Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007); Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile
Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (S.D. Fla. 2011); Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, No. 10-C-6517,
2011 WKL 3205399 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2011); Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F.
Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Arista Records, LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d
481 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), superseded by 784 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); 10 Group, Inc. v.
Jordon, 708 F. Supp. 2d 989 (N.D. Cal. 2010); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks,
Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Arista Records, LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633
F. Supp. 2d 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v. Ideal World Direct, 516 F.
Supp. 2d 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
98 See, e.g., Perect 10 v. Amazon.com, 487 F.3d 701; Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d 514; Veoh, 665 F.
Supp. 2d 1099.
99See Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931 (WHP), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 93351 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011); Hotjile, 798 F. Supp. 2d 1303.
100 MP3Tunes, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93351; see Mitchell Zimmerman, Mp3.com Redux?
Music Venture's Model Survives Copyight Challenge a.s S.D.N. Y. Provides Guidance for Cloud-
Based Services, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 26, 2011),
http://www.lexology .com/library/detail.aspx?g=6f9aba6O-91f4-4d6b-9062-8afff86c99f5.
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attractive terms, section 512 permitted them to go ahead without
copyright licenses.""
Frustrated with the courts, the copyright owner lobbies
decided to press their case to Congress. They championed new
"rogue websites" legislation that would enable copyright owners to
designate any online site as "dedicated to the theft of U.S.
Property," and require ad services and payment processors to stop
doing business with the site, even if it would have qualified for safe
harbor protection under section 512.12 As introduced, the bill
empowered any intellectual property owner harmed by a site that
facilitates copyright infringement to serve a notice on credit
companies or advertising services that do business with the site.
On receipt of the notice, and without any judicial involvement, the
credit card and advertising companies would have been obliged to
cease doing business with the site within five days."' This is an
extension of the name-calling strategy that, ten years ago, resulted
in a vast expansion of the meaning of the term "piracy." By
branding ordinary websites with the "rogue" and "dedicated to
theft" labels, copyright owners hoped to persuade Congress to give
them power to remove the sites from the Internet. In January of
2012, a coalition of high tech companies and millions of Internet
users rose up in protest of the legislation."" The bills' supporters
101 E.g., Antony Bruno, Google lusic Launches Without Label I ceses, HOLLYWOOD REP.
(May 10, 2011, 3:23 AM), http://www.hollywoodreportei.com/news/google-music-
launches-label-licenses-187022; Timothy B. Lee, Unlicensed: Are Google Music and Amazon
Cloud Player Illegal?, ARS TECHNICA (July 4, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://aistechnica.com/tech-
policy/ news/ 2011/ 07/ are-google- music-and-amazon-cloud-playei-illegal.ars.
102 See Rashmi Rangnath, SOPA and the DI(A Safe fIarbols, PUB. KNOIEDGE POL'Y BLOG,
(Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.publicknowledge.oig/blog/sopa-and-dmca-safe-harbors.
Although the "rogue website" legislation was marketed to Congress as a remedy directed
at foreign infringers, see, e.g., Rogue Websites Legislation, MOTION PICTURE ASS'N AM.,
http://www.mpaa.oig/contentpiotection/ioguewebsites (last visited Jan. 6, 2012), the
statutory language was broad enough to encompass many domestic sites with legitimate
business models. See Rebecca MacKinnon, Stop the Great lirewall of Ametica, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/opinion/fiiewall-lawN-could-
infringe-on-free-speech.html; Mike Masnick, Viacom Exec: 'Everyone Knows a Rogue Site When
The) See One'... Except Ie Doesn't, TECHDIRT (Nov. 9, 2011, 12:03 PM),
http://www.techdiirt.com/aiticles/20111108/23201616688/viacom-exec-ever-yone-knows-
Iogue-site-when-they-see-one-except-he-doesnt.shtml; Mike Masnick, Universal Mu sic Goes to
War Against Popular Hip Hop Sites & Biogs, TECHDIRT (June 20, 2011, 11:22 AM),
http://www.techdiit.com/aiticles/20110620/01370314750/universal-music-goes-to-wai-
against-popular-hip-hop-sites-blogs.shtml. The provisions of H.R. 3261, as introduced,
were so loopy that it seems incredible that anyone might have expected Congress to enact
the legislation. The Register of Copyrights, however, supported the bill, which she
described as "serious and comprehensive" as well as "measured." Ileaing on I.R. 3261
Bejore the H. Comm. on the judiciary, 1120 Cong. (Nov. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/iegstatll6ll.html (statement of Maria A. Pallante,
Register of Copyrights).
10o H.R. 3261 § 103(b) (1)-(2).
104 See Jonathan Weisman, In Fight Over Piracy Bills, New Economy Rises Against Old, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2012) http://wNw.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/technology/web-piotests-
piracy-bill-and-2-key-senators-change-cour se.html.
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backed off." Copyright owner lobbies complained that the strong
public opposition had been manufactured by an irresponsible
misinformation campaign orchestrated by Google.1 "t  They have
not given up on a legislative solution."" They are realizing with
some chagrin, however, that it may be impossible to persuade
Congress to enact the relief they seek without the cooperation of
the very companies that they are seeking to hold responsible.
Does any of this matter? Big media adopted a strategy to
preserve its dominance in the entertainment marketplaces. That
strategy, in retrospect, seems to have been self-defeating. Content
owners are suffering from wounds that are predominantly self-
inflicted, and seeking to offload the blame on consumers, search
engines, and foreigners.08 Readers, viewers and listeners have
access to an extraordinary variety of works, which they can choose
10) Id.; Editorial, Onine Piracy and Political Overreach, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2002)
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/opinion/online-piracy-and-political-
oveir-each.html.
1 06 E.g., Darren Franich, The IPAA Talks About SOPA-PIPA and Responds to the "Canpaign of
Misinformation, " POPWATCH BLOG, ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY (Jan. 25, 2012, 7:30 p.m.)
http://popwatch.ew.com/2012/01/25/sopa-pipa-mpaa-thomas-edison/. This exchange
between the interviewer and the Motion Picture Association's Vice President for Global
Policy and External Affairs captures the flavor:
ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY: Major internet companies and plenty of people
in the online community were up in arms over this legislation. From your
perspective, where does this negative response come from?
Michael O'Leary, SEVP for GP & EA, MPAA: I think it's not a biv secret that that
was driven mostly by Goode. When this debate moved from Conaress to the
Internet, they control the platform there. They control the means of
communication in that space. Thev used it without any discretion or without any
restraint. What you had was this campaivn of misinformation which, frankly,
caused the reaction that you saw. I don't think from our perspective there's any
big mystery where this came fron.
Id. See also, Cary Sherman, What Wikipedia Won't Tell You, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2012)
http://www nytimes.com/2012/02/08/opinion/what-wikipedia-wont-tell-yoi.html
("When Wikipedia and Goole purport to be neutral sources of information, but then
exploit their stature to present information that is not only not neutral but affirmativelv
incomplete and misleadina, they are duping their users into accepting as truth what are
merely self-serving political declarations."). In contrast, Forbes magazine's Larry Magid
argues that Internet advocacy groups had been working for months to defeat the
legislation, but that nobody paid attention until Google and Wikipedia got on board.
Larry Magid, SOPA and PIPA Defeat: People Power or Coporate Clout?, FORBES (Jan. 31 2012,
10:40 AM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2012/01/31/sopa-and-pipa-defeat-
peoples-power-or-corpoiate-clout/.
107 E.g., AriHsts on SOPA/PIPA, LOCus, Feb. 2012, at 10, 74; Declan McCullagh, Hollywood's
Gentler post-SOPA Staregy: A Charm O{J/ensive, CNET NEWS (Feb. 6, 2012 2:15 p.m.)
http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921 3-57372174-281/hollyw oods-gentleir-post-sopa-strategy-
a-charm-offensive/; Sherman, supa note 106.
108 It's not obvious that the music, movie, or book business is in decline overall. See, e.g.,
Michael Masnick & Michael Ho, The Sky is Rising: A Detailed Look at the State of the
Entertainment Industry (Jan. 2012)
http://gigaom2.files.woidpress.com/2012/01/theskyisiising.pdf. The competition
among music providers, for example, has led to a decrease in the price of recorded music;
sales appear to have increased in response to better prices. Brett Pulley, Record Sales
Increase as Lady Gaga, Adele Find a Future with Spot, Rdio, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 14, 2011,
12:01 AM), http://mobile.bloombeig.com/news/2011-11-14/record-sales-rise-as-lady-
gaga-adele-find-a-futu re-with-spotify.h tml.
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to buy, rent, borrow or steal via diverse routes."
On the other hand, the story so far is not ending happily for
creators. While legacy entertainment behemoths have cast
themselves as creators' friends in their anti-piracy commercialso
and testimony to Congress,"' they've not behaved very friendlily.
First, there's the matter of payment. Twentieth century copyright
law created a system with notable weaknesses in its mechanisms for
paying the creators who authored works."' The twenty-first
century is shaping up to be worse. Legacy content owners have
begun to license their content to online disseminators, but have
sought to structure the licenses to enable them to pay minimal
royalties."' Google has introduced a host of ways for copyright
owners to "monetize" their content by splitting ad revenue. It pays
that money to rights holders, not creators, relying on the rights
holders to pay creators." Or not. Apple, Amazon, Sirius-XM, and
1)9 Readers, listeners and viewers who bought subscriptions to services that have closed
their Virtual doors and erased their customers' music have some cause for complaint. See
Eliot Van Buskirk, Sony Connect Music Stoie Closing (Sony Players to Add Plays jor Sue), WIRED
(Aug. 30, 2007), http://www.wired.com/listening-post/2007/08/sony-connect-mu; Matt
Rosoff, MySpace Buties iMeen, CNET NEWS (Dec. 8, 2009, 4:14 PM),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13526 3-10411710-27.html.
110 E.g., Antipiracy PSA, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watchv=6YScoXn31Mg
(uploaded June 9, 2011); see also Rogue Websites Legislation, MOTION PICTURE Ass'N AM.,
http://www.mpaa.oig/contentpiotection/oguewebsites (click "Stories from Creators")
("Meetjust a few of the working men and women in America's creative community whose
lives - and livelihoods - are affected by internet content theft.").
I See, e.g., Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online: The ART Act, the NET Act
and Illegal Streaming, Ileaing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual rlop., (ompetition, and the
Internet of the H. Comm. on the judiciaty, 1120 Cong. (June 1, 2011) (testimony of Michael P.
O'Leary, Vice President of the Motion Picture Association of America), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/heaiings/pdf/OLeary0612011.pdf.
ii 2 Jessica Litman, Real Coppvight Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8-12 (2010).
113 See FBT Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (90 Cir. 2010); Ridenhour V.
UMG Recordings, No. 4:11-cy-05321-DMR (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011); James v. UMG
Recordings, No. 3:11-cv-01613-SI (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011); "The Youngbloods" v. BMG
Music, No 07 Civ. 2394 (GBD) (KNF), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1585 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2011).
See, e.g., Ben Sisario, Eminem Lawstit May Raise Pay fo; Older Actists, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/28/business/media/28eminem.html; Neil
Strauss, Record Labels' Answer to Na)ster Still Has Artists Feeling Bypassed, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18,
2002), http://wNw.nytimes.com/2002/02/18/arts/record-labels-answer-to-napster-still-
has-artists-feeling-bypassed.html?pagewanted all&src pm. See als Mark Cuban, Some
Intimate Details on the Google You Tube Deal, BLOG MAVERICK (Oct. 30, 2006, 5:35 AM),
http://blogmaverick.com/2006/10/30/some-intimate-details-on-the-google-youtube-deal
(reposting an anonymous report that entertainment companies negotiated with YouTube
to acquire small equity stakes in the company rather than making licensing deals in order
to avoid royalty obligations).
114 See Future of Music Coalition, Killer Apps, Conflicting Law: Remixing Mu sic ComIpen sation,
Vimeo (Oct. 4, 2011), http://vimeo.com/32891305; Eliot Van Buskirk, Neil Young: Failed
Wartei/YouITuhe Negotiations 'Penalized' Actists, WIRED (Mar. 2, 2009, 1:24 PM),
http://www.wired.com/evicenter/2009/03/neil-vouna-vout (ouotini YouTube
Spokesman Chris Dale: "YouTube connects music, musicians, and fans . . . . We have
deals with all of the other major record labels and with musicians, sonawriters, and other
independent creative producers. It is the record labels' responsibility to represent and pay
their artists."); Jon Irwin, Stkeaming Services Are Cutting Big Checks for Rights Jlolders,
BILLBOARD (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.billboaid.biz/bbbiz/industry/digital-and-
mobile/streaming-seiices-are-cutting-big-checks-1005432232.stoiy ("Rhapsody has
generated hundreds of millions of dollars in royalties that have been paid out to record
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Rhapsody similarly, license music from rights holders, who may or
may not exploit opportunities to reduce their royalty
obligations. 11
Nor have copyright owners taken advantage of other
opportunities to prove that they're creators' friends. As
publishers, record labels and film studios have become divisions of
huge corporate conglomerates, they have responded to pressure
to improve their bottom lines by reducing artist development
efforts and declining to invest in projects that don't seem likely to
become megahits.11 ' The recording industry missed an important
opportunity to show that its interests aligned with its artists' when
it failed to share any of the settlement money collected from the
30,000 'John Doe" suits it filed against individual file sharers with
the artists whose recordings were shared. Music publishers,"'
record labels,"' and multimedia entertainment companies"' have
fought tooth and nail to prevent authors and their heirs from
exercising their statutory rights to terminate copyright transfers,
rather than spend money to renegotiate deals.
As Google, Amazon, and Apple have extended their reach
into markets traditionally served by book publishers,'" record
labels, music publishers and their representatives. ... W.e trust that this royalty revenue is
flowing to artists, writers and the other creative folks responsible for the music . . . .").
115 See, e.g., Ben Sisario, Sirius's M~ove to Bypass a Royalty Payment (ieauinghouse Causes an
Uroar, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/07/business/media/siriuss-move-to-bypass-royalty-
agency-causes-uproar.html.
Sirius's move was only the latest example of a gradual shift in the financial
infrastructure of music. Many companies, from major labels to providers of
background music, have been trying to reduce costs and gain control by
circumventing the large organizations that have historically processed licenses
and royalties.
Such direct deals are perfectly legal. But opponents of the move by Sirius say that it could
result in less money and more complications for artists. Id.
lit See, e.g., Kot, supra note 22, at 5-12;JOEL RASMUSSEN & ANDREW SHAPTER, BEFORE THE
MusIc DIES (2006) (documentaiy film), available at
http://www.imdb.com/video/hulu/vi3758949145.
117 See Mills Music, Inc., v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985); Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No.
3:11 -c-01557-BTM-RBB (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2011) (complaint available at
http://iptablog.org/uploads/ScorpioMusic-'-Willis.pdf); Larry Spier, Inc. v. Bourne, Co.,
750 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
118 See Fifty Six Hope Road Music, Ltd. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 6143 (DLC),
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94500 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2010); Kal Raustiala & Chris Sprigman,
The Music hdusty Copyight Battle: When Is Owning More Like Renting, FREAKONOMICS BLOG
(Aug. 31, 2011, 10:38 AM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2011/08/31/the-music-
industr-copyright-battle-when-is-ow ning-mor-e-like-irenting; Larry Rohter, Record Industiry
Braces for Artists' Battle over Song Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/arts/music/spiringsteen-and-others-soon-eligible-
to-recover-song-rights.html.
119 See Classic Media, Inc., v. Mewborn, 532 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008); Milne ex rel. Coyne
v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2005); Marvel Characters, Inc., v.
Simon, 310 F. 3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002); Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d 720
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (C.D. Cal.
2009); Archie Comic Publ'ns, Inc., v. DeCarlo, 258 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
120 SeeJulie Bosman, Agent and Foimer Publisher to Lead New Iminint fn Amazon, N.Y. TIMES
BLOG (May 23, 2011, 8:46 AM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/agent-
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labels,"' and motion picture distributors,' they have introduced
direct distribution options, which allow creators to bypass
traditional intermediaries.' It remains to be seen whether
creators will be able to realize more money or reach larger
audiences by sidestepping legacy intermediaries. But
conventional media companies are giving most of them scant
reason to stick around.
and-formei-publishei-to-lead-new-imprint-for-amazon. See alo Amazon Publishing,
AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/featuie.html?ie=UTF8&docld=1000664761 (last
visited Jan. 6, 2012); Google Books, ANDROID MARKET,
https://maiket.android.com/books (last visitedJan. 6, 2012); What's on iTunes - Books,
APPLE, http://www.apple.com/itunes/whats-on/#books (last visitedJan. 6, 2012).
121 See Amazon MP3, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/MP3-Music-
Download/b/ref-sa menu mp3_stir1/188-2383815-
0714917?_encoding=UTF8&node=163856011 (last visited Jan. 6, 2012); Google Music,
ANDROID MARKET, https://market.android.com/music (last visited Jan. 6, 2012); What's
on iTunes: Music, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/itunes/wvhats-on/#music (last visited
Jan. 6, 2012).
122 See Amazon Instant Video, AMAZON, http: //www.amazon.com /Instant-
Video/b/ref-sa menu atv9?ie=UTF8&node=2858778011 (last visited Jan. 6, 2012);
Google Movies, ANDROID MARKET, https://maiket.android.com/molvies (last visited Jan.
6, 2012); What's on iTunes - Movies, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/itines/whats-
on/#movies (last visited Jan. 6, 2012); What's on iTunes - TV Shows, APPLE,
http://www.apple.com/itunes/wvhats-on/#tvshows (last visited Jan. 6, 2012); YouTube
Home, http://wNw.youtube.com (last visitedJan. 6, 2012).
123 See Google Mtisic for Artists, GOOGLE, http://music.google.com/artists/ (last visited
Jan. 6, 2012); Partner as a Content Provider, APPLE,
http://www.apple.com/itunes/content-piovideis/
(http://www.apple.com/itunes/content-providers); Self-Publish with Us, Amazon,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/seller-account/mm-summary-
page.html?topic 200260520&ld=AZSelfPiblishMakeM (last visited Jan. 6, 2012); David
Streitfield, Amazon Signs up Authors, Writing Publishers out of Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/technology/amazon-iewrites-the-iules-of-
book-publishing.html.
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